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ZAPPERS AND PHANTOM-WARE AT THE FTA:
ARE THEY LISTENING NOW?
Richard Thompson Ainsworth
When the Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) held a national Compliance and
Education Workshop in Louisville, Kentucky (February 25-27, 2001) one of the invited speakers
was Kevin Pratt, Manager, Underground Economy, Canadian Customs and Revenue Authority
(CCRA). He spoke on Zappers.1
To the best of anyone’s present recollection,2 this was the first time zappers had been
discussed with a large group of state-level US tax compliance professionals. However, most of
the information that the CCRA presented to the FTA in 2001 was not its own – it was derivative.
Zapper investigations were not an in-house specialty of the CCRA (although they were a matter
of considerable concern).
Zapper investigations had been the specialty of the Quebec Ministry of Revenue (MRQ),3
and it was from the MRQ that the CCRA learned about zappers.4 Mr. Pratt’s presentation clearly
1

Kevin Pratt, Tax Evasion in a Electronic Environment – “Zapping, (power point slide 6, presented at the FTA
Compliance Education Workshop, Louisville, Kentucky (Feb. 25-27, 2001) (on file with author). This invitation
was timely. Just the week before (February 19-21, 2001) Mr. Pratt was speaking on this same topic at the
Federal/Provincial Meeting of the Underground Economy Working Group at the Conference Center in Ottawa. His
topic there was also the “Zapper.” This meeting ended with the following “Enforcement Strategy Proposal”
Zapper Software
• Share information pertaining to potential users and suppliers.
• Share MRQ [Quebec Ministry of Revenue] legislation to address compliance issues
• Identify key stakeholders for the development of an education/awareness plan.
Federal/Provincial Meeting of the Underground Economy Working Group, Meeting Agenda and Schedule A, (Feb.
19-21, 2001) obtained through a Request for Information pursuant to the Access to Information Act, R.S.C.
(1985)(Can.) (on file with author).
2
It is apparent that the “present recollection” is not accurate. Mr. Pratt’s slides from 2001 note that the “MRQ
previously presented the issue of “Zappers” to the FTA.” However, this author cannot find any record of this
“presentation” within either the MRQ or the FTA. It may have been an informal presentation. See, supra note 1, at
slide 6.
3
Revenue Quebec was first made aware of zappers in 1996. The early investigations by Revenue Quebec included
tax years as far back as 1994. David Bergeron, Pacific Region ECAS Conference (date) (location of conference)
slide 3.
4
After explaining the Canadian enforcement structure and how (under the Canadian system) the MRQ administers
both Provincial and Federal level taxes (slides 1- 6), and then providing a general definition of Zappers (slide 7), Mr.
Pratt moves into a discussion of zapper enforcement actions taken by the MRQ. He indicated: (1) that the first
searches for zappers were conducted in 1997, and that by 1998 a departmental committee was formed within the
MRQ to review and propose solutions, and finally that over 100 searches had been conducted with many audits
ongoing and that the MRQ had identified multiple zapper software programs; (slide 8) (2) that MRQ had set in
motion a four phase action plan to deal with zappers (slide 9); and (3) provided an extended example set in grocery
store fact pattern – a very simple “zapper-like” fraud that involved placing some ECRs in a network configuration
“off line” so that their sales could be skimmed (slides 10 & 11). [Although not expressly revealed by Mr. Pratt, it is
likely that this example is based on the Metro Supermarket investigation that was widely reported on in the
Canadian press. See,CP, Ottawa Still Struggling to Catch ‘Zapper’ Tax Cheats Five Years Later, THE BROCKVILLE
RECORDER & TIMES (Ontario, Canada) at 47 (Jan. 2, 2003)]. Mr. Pratt’s presentation concluded with a re-statement
of the “Enforcement Strategy Proposal” that were agreed upon the previous week at the Federal/Provincial Meeting
of the Underground Economy Working Group, supra note 1.
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indicates that he (and the CCRA) considered themselves to be conduits through which MRQ
experiences were being shared. This was only right. Ever since the first real zapper case was
assembled in 1997 by a persistent and very dedicated MRQ auditor,5 the MRQ had been working
to defeat this technology-facilitated fraud.
Some things have changed in Canada since 2001, but not the MRQ’s leadership with
respect to “all-things-having-to-do-with-zappers.”6 There are very good reasons for this, some of
which will be considered here.7
Over this same period of time some things changed in US state-level tax enforcement
also, but not much has changed with respect to zappers. It has been as if the FTA did not take to
heart what the CCRA had told it. Perhaps the CCRA’s talk (or an earlier presentation possibly
made by the MRQ) was not persuasive, or perhaps by highlighting that it was Quebec’s
experience with zappers (rather than direct CCRA experiences, or the experiences of other
5

The story is told that before anyone in any Canadian tax administration had heard of a zapper an MRQ auditor
scheduled to audit a restaurant decided that she should patronize the restaurant she was to audit a few weeks later.
She paid for her meal in cash, and saved her receipt. On audit she looked for the record of her purchase. What she
found struck her as exceedingly strange. Instead of seeing (for example):
French onion soup ………….$10.00
T-bone Steak………………..$25.00
Medium Rare
Total:………………………..$35.00
She saw that the electronic record of her meal had been changed to:
French onion soup ………….$10.00
Medium Rare
Total:………………………..$10.00
The tax concern was that not only had the consumption tax (QST and GST) been re-calculated on a
$10.00 base instead of the $35.00 base on which it had been paid, but the gross receipts of the business for income
tax purposes was lower by $25.00. Some-how the entire line “T-bone steak ……$25.00” had vanished from the
records, and the total bill had been recalculated.
However, there was a “trace” of the original purchase in the modified records. The “Medium Rare”
designation (perhaps because it was on a separate line) remained. Now it appeared that a nonsensical “Medium Rare
French onion soup” was ordered. By pulling on this thread the first Canadian zapper case unraveled. Personal
communication from David Bergeron, (June 9, 2008) (notes of conversation on file with author).
6
Revenue Quebec posts news releases of significant tax evasion enforcement actions on its web site (in French
only). Among these listings there are a large number of cases involving sales zappers (camoufleur de ventes).
From 2003 to 2008 there are eighty-eight cases. There are an even larger number of cases where zappers
may have been involved, but the notice only indicates that a business “failed to report sales,” or “kept a double set of
books,” or “failed to keep an accurate set of books.” Compared with other jurisdictions, like the Netherlands where
there are less than ten litigated cases, or the US where there are two, or Sweden where there is one, or the UK and
Ireland where there are none, this is a very robust enforcement record. The Revenue Quebec press releases on Tax
Evasion are available at: http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/
(last visited June 13, 2008).
It should be noted however, that this may be an unequal comparison. If a zapper is found in a revenue
enforcement action litigation may not necessarily be the norm. In fact, the Revenue Quebec site lists investigations
and in most cases the taxpayers involved are simply pleading guilty, not contesting the determination. If the same
pattern arises elsewhere, then barring postings like those of Revenue Quebec, one might not expect to be able to find
a similar list. Then again, this author has not been able to locate any jurisdiction where there seems to be a similar
concentration of zapper cases. Nothing even comes close to the Quebec statistics.
7
A further consideration of zappers, phantom-ware and the solutions that governments are using to cope with them
is the topic of different (as yet unpublished) paper by this author. Leading approaches are those offered by Quebec,
Germany and Greece.
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Canadian provinces) Mr. Pratt unintentionally sent a message to the FTA that zappers were a
Quebec-only problem.8
The US attitude is just now beginning to change. Zappers were discussed at the October
2007 FTA/MTC Audit and Technology Workshop, and then again at the March 2008 FTA
Compliance Workshop.9 This paper tracks a third zapper discussion at the FTA, the presentation
that this author was invited to give at the 2008 Annual Meeting on June 9, 2008.10 In spite of
this renewed interest, the fact remains that to this day the US has uncovered only two zappers –
the one at Stew Leonard’s Dairy in Norwalk, Connecticut11 and another at the LaShish restaurant
chain in Detroit, Michigan12 Maybe this statistic is about to change?
This paper presents the case that zappers, or more generally automated sales suppression
devices are a global problem. Zappers are everywhere because they have entered the blood
stream of the commercial market-place. They are frequently the element that makes or breaks a
deal for a new ECR or POS system. Businesses large and small are regularly offered
opportunities to invisibly skim cash receipts with this technology, and many are taking advantage
of it. Tax administrations are responding, and the US needs to join in this effort.
TERMINOLOGY
Terminology complicates research in this area, so it is best to define some terms and
distinguish some usages in the beginning. In general we are examining software programs that
are used in conjunction with electronic cash registers (ECRs) or point of sale (POS) systems to
alter business records, allowing owners to skim cash receipts. This is a relatively new
technology field (although it is an old fraud), and as with all technology areas there are
“generations” of technology that follow (sometimes very rapidly) one upon another as the field
develops. Thus, it is important that we adopt terminology that will not only allow us to discuss
the whole field, but permit us to classify generational developments.

8

The assessment that zappers are a “Quebec-only” [or a “Canada-only”] problem seems to remain common
currency. For example, when the following question was recently presented to the Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue:
“Have you seen a zapper in Pennsylvania?”
The answer was:
“We do not have Zappers [in Pennsylvania. However, t]hey are being deployed in Canada … mostly in the
restaurant businesses …”
Personal e-mail communication to Janis Holloway, responded to by Robert Coyne (May 16, 2008) (on file with
author).
9
Personal e-mail communication from John Feldman (Jun. 11, 2008) (indicating that these meetings were for
government personnel only) (on file with author).
10
Richard T. Ainsworth, Zappers: Technology-assisted Tax Fraud (power-point presentation on file with author).
11
U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(although the tax case was settled, the details of the fraud are preserved in these federal sentencing appeals).
12
Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Eastern District of Michigan, Superseding Indictment returned Against
LaShish Owner (May 30, 2007) available at:
http://www.justice.gov/tax/usaopress/2007/txdv072007_5_30_chahine.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
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The term automated sale suppression device13 is the general classification for all software
programs used or designed to facilitate cash skimming. Phantom-ware is a sub-classification. It
includes the first two generations of automated sales suppression devices – self-help phantomware, and factory installed phantom-ware. Zappers are a third generation of automated sales
suppression devices.
Phantom-ware.14 Phantom-ware is programming placed within a modern ECR or POS
system that can be used to hide the skimming of cash sales. Phantom-ware is “hidden” (in the
sense of not being disclosed in user manuals). Its use, operation, and even its existence may be
very difficult to detect on audit.
Phantom-ware re-programs an ECR or POS system so that selected types of cash sales
are not recorded (receipts can be renumbered to follow a new sequence, Z Reports and X Reports
can be altered, and the Electronic Journal can be brought into conformity with all other changes).
This programming exists on most systems for good (but occasionally remote) business purposes,
and there are good reasons for having it “hidden” from employees. For example during a
bankruptcy sell-off of business assets a buyer of the ECR would want to clear the electronic
journal. Programming is needed to do this, but one might not want the night shift manager to
know how to do this with instructions set out in the user’s manual.15
Because it relies on a manual re-programming of systems this is called self-help
phantom-ware. Installers, distributors and manufacturers frequently provide help-desk support
and will guide owners in the use of these “hidden” functions. Help-desk personnel may suspect,
but have no reason to definitively know that a user is asking for help to commit fraud. There is
of course something akin to Admiral Nelson’s “turning a blind eye” here,16 as these systems do
13

“Automated sales suppression,” “electronic sales suppression,” or “sales suppression technologies” is the
preferred expression of the CRA these days. For example, at the 2007 International Tax Dialogue Conference the
Director General SME Directorate, Compliance Program Branch indicated:
One of the most popular means to suppress sales is to utilize electronic suppression of sales
technologies, such as “Zapper.” The CRA is actively working with provincial counterparts
(through the FPTUEWG) to address Zapper and other point-of-sales suppression technologies.
Jim Gauvreau, SME Audit and Verification Strategies and Techniques Based on Risk Detection and Risk Selection,
ITD Global Conference on Taxation of Small and Medium Enterprises 14 (parallel session 4, stream B) (Buenos
Aires, Argentina)(Oct. 17-19, 2007) available at:
http://www.itdweb.org/SMEconference/documents/parallel/4B%20GAUVREAU%20CANADA.pdf
A similar expression, “fraudulent risk software” is used in many EU documents. For example, the Cash
Register Good Practice Guide dedicates Appendix F to “Fraudulent Risk Software.” This Guide identifies forty-two
different “risks” in Appendix B, assimilating everything from self-help phantom-ware through zappers and more
within this expression. See, Fiscalis Committee Project Group 12, Cash Register Project Group, Cash Register
Good Practice Guide, Appendix B & F(Dec. 2006) (on file with author).
14
The term “phantom-ware” originates with this author, who after struggling with imprecise and overlapping
terminology employed elsewhere, decided that a new expression was needed.
15
See, IRS, Ex-Burger King Manager Sentenced in IRS Fraud Case for Skimming $180,000 in Cash (relating the
manual skimming fraud orchestrated by the night manager of a chain of Burger King restaurants that involved
simply not ringing sales through the register, or voiding sales made, a fraud which would have been more easily
carried out with technology) available at: http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=163019,00.html
16
Admiral Horatio Nelson in the naval battle of Copenhagen (1801) when leading the attack against the
Danish/Norwegian fleet (reportedly) willfully disobeyed an order from his commander Admiral Hyde Parker to
disengage. He did this by placing his telescope to his eye that was blind and declared that he could not see the flags
signaling disengagement. Nelson won the battle.
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not preserve a record of the re-programming action. There is of course a real danger to the
fraudster if they did, because a government auditor might suspect fraud in a business that
repeatedly programmed and re-programmed its ECRs to start and stop Z or X Report, or entries
in the Electronic Journal.
When manufacturers or software providers take the next step and automate the reprogramming of self-help phantom-ware (to reduce the likelihood of user re-programming
errors) the risk that the manufacturer/software provider will be pulled into a criminal tax fraud
audit is elevated. This is factory-installed phantom-ware. It is the next generation of this
software, and it presents a different constellation of legal and audit issues.
In this new generation the technology has changed,17 but the technology only has one
purpose – a fraud purpose. It is still phantom-ware – programming hidden in the software – but
it requires much less manual intervention to operate. It can still be found by auditors if the
operating system of the ECR or POS system is broken down.
Zappers.18 Zappers are not embedded in operating programs of ECRs or POS systems;
they are add-on programs that are removed as easily as they are added to a system. Zappers can
17

The Cash Register Good Practice Guide notes at ¶ 4.1:
In countries that have no legislative requirement to use Fiscal Tills, tax auditors are now
encountering increasingly sophisticated electronic till systems that present potentially enormous
risks.
These till systems are extremely vulnerable to all three risk types identified. In particular,
new tills systems are being manufactured with “fraudulent risk” software installed as standard.
18
“Zapper” is the term originally used “on the street” (in Quebec) to describe an automated sales suppression device.
In the early days, a “Sales Zapper” was a specific commercially available product purchased (frequently over the
internet for about $500.00). This product was identified by name in several investigative reports in the Canadian
press in 1997, and was adopted by MRQ to describe all devices in this field.
When researching in French sources the expression used for the English word “zapper” is camoufleur de
ventes. For example, Revenue Quebec describes the recent investigation into the activities of Logicaisse Ltd. As
follows (emphasis added):
Revenu Québec a des motifs raisonnables de croire que cette société a conçu et distribué un
camoufleur de ventes (communément appelé zapper), utilisé avec le logiciel RMS-Touch, dont
elle est le distributeur exclusif au Québec, et qu'elle a permis à différentes sociétés, principalement
des restaurants, de se servir de ce camoufleur pour dissimuler des ventes afin d'éluder le paiement
des taxes et des impôts.
Which translates as:
Revenue Quebec has reasonable grounds to believe that this company has designed and distributed
a camoufleur sales (commonly called zapper), the software used with RMS-Touch, which it is
the exclusive distributor in Quebec, and has enabled different companies, mainly restaurants, use
this camoufleur to conceal sales to evade payment of taxes.
Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Les systèmes informatiques Logicaisse ltée dans la mire de Revenu Québec
(Computer systems Ltd. Logicaisse in the grasp of Revenue Quebec) (Mar. 12, 2008) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2008/12mars.asp
As late as April 25, 2001 the CCRA was following MRQ usage. This was the expression used by Kevin
Pratt at the FTA meetings in Louisville, Kentucky in February 2001 and was the expression used by Mr. Pinternal in
a memorandum from Regional Attorneys Serge Clairoux and Jean Marois to Jean-Francois Normand at the Head
Quarters for the Underground Economy. Here the CCRA refers to a “Zapper Initiative,” and indicates that CCRA
wanted to “take the lead” on this issue. However, this memo and others also concede that in fact the CCRA was
following the well marked path of the MRQ :
History
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be physically hidden during an audit. Zappers, like factory-installed phantom-ware, have no
purpose other than to facilitate skimming by reconstructing (deleting, replacing or
supplementing) ECR or POS system records.
Zappers are contained on CDs or memory sticks. They can be removed and hidden on
the first signs of an audit. Without a disclosure by the fraudster (or the distributor, or the zapperdeveloper) the use of a zapper is nearly impossible to detect. Traces of zapper use however, can
be found when fraudsters are not careful, or if the zapper is not well designed. Occasionally
back-up records remain in a POS system or an ECR that reference the original transaction data.
For this reason, technical support is frequently needed when zappers are used, just as they are
with phantom-ware applications – something that leads to long-term business-fraud
relationships.
THE DEVELOPMENT TIME LINE
Skimming cash sales is a traditional tax fraud. It has been practiced with two physical
tills for a long time – one for the taxman and the other off the record. The traditional way of
uncovering a cash skimming operation is to look for the other set of books, or to find a cash
hoard, or to find that inventory purchases far exceed reported sales.
Needless to say, technology can make a lot of these detection points easier to hide. A
digital second set of books is easier to hide than paper ledgers, and a good zapper program
(particularly if it is placed on the server that integrates a network of ECRs and other accounting
In December 1997, Radio Canada current affairs program “Le Point” ran a story about
the use of Zappers. The week after, a meeting was held involving UE [Underground Economy],
Investigations from HQ, Montreal and Ontario and Quebec provincial officers. As conclusion, it
has been decided that HQ-UE should take the lead of this issue. A series of recommendations
were also provided to Mr. Lacombe, former ADM. [The recommendations have been redacted.]
Until now, the MRQ [Ministry of Revenue Quebec] has proceeded to complete several
audits, Investigations and searches related to Zapper users. On May 12th, we received a press
release from MRQ about the Nickles group who plead guilty to 74 charges of tax evasion. [The
enclosed copy of the guilty plea has been redacted.] …
Definition
Zapper software programs are electronic means of concealing revenues. Taxpayers can
delete 5, 10, 15 percent or more of their sales by activating an accounting software program. In
order to eliminate as many trails as possible, Zappers are used mainly in cash transactions.
Memo obtained through a Request for Information pursuant to the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. (1985)(Can.)
(on file with author).
“Zapper” is also the expression used in early OECD documents to describe the whole field of automated
sales suppression devices (admittedly in the very last paragraph on the very last page of an e-commerce report):
However, an intimate knowledge of how to manipulate computer systems is not required where
unscrupulous software programs, such as “zapper” are developed. These programs are specifically
designed to falsify records and hide certain transactions. News of these techniques generally
spreads rapidly through an industry, especially traditional cash based industries. Tax authorities
will have to be attuned to new tools to defeat the integrity of systems much as they must keep
abreast of new tax dodges and schemes for illegally sheltering income. Tax authorities must also
make sure that they have audit experts that are experienced in online business methods and
models. They must catalogue and understand the digital footprints that electronic records leave
and develop compliance models for online business types that provide a basis for comparison
across tax paying entities.
OECD, REPORT BY THE TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP (TAG) (Dec. 2000) 93.
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systems) can also eliminate (“zap”) inventory records so that purchases closely match “zapped”
sales. To accomplish this (inventory zapping) it is necessary to purchase a certain percent of
inventory in cash.
Technology mitigates certain risks of detection, but technology can also bring with it new
risks – particularly if the business owner (fraudster) is not comfortable with automation. Thus,
the development line for sales suppression devices has been to try to devise “idiot-proof”
systems. The following sections will present cases from along this development line: (a)
traditional double tills, leading to (b) self-help phantom-ware, and then (c) factory-installed
phantom-ware, and finally (d) zappers.
TRADITIONAL DOUBLE TILL CASES
Traditional double till cases are relatively easy to find. Traditional cash skimming fraud
is not unique to any jurisdiction, nor is it unique to a particular tax system. It is just as common
where the consumption tax is a VAT, as it is where the consumption tax is a retail sales tax. It is
more common in family-owned businesses where knowledge of the skimming can be kept
“hidden” among close relations.
Comparing the two examples that follow, Aleef Garage Ltd. and Guerico, one might have
expected that the size of the Aleef Garage skimming operation would have warranted the use of
technology (if only to keep the records straight). But technology was not employed. Thus, Aleef
Garage gives some idea of how large a traditional skimming fraud can be. Guerico, on the other
hand, shows how simply a double till skim can be set up.
Aleef Garage Ltd. On November 12, 2007 seven people were jailed for over eleven years
in Liverpool, U.K. for their part in a £5.3 million tax fraud that essentially involved skimming
cash sales from newspaper sales and automobile repairs.19 Aleef Garage Ltd., founded over
twenty-five years ago, is among the largest family owned retailers in the North West U.K. with
over fifty petrol stations and shops in the city centers of Greater Manchester, Lancashire and
Cheshire. The business employed approximately 250 people with an annual turnover in excess
of £92 million.20 As reported in Director of Finance On Line:
The cash fund [that was skimmed] had been principally achieved by a
number of newsagents operating two tills, but only declaring in the official
records the money which was taken from one of them, and simply keeping quiet
about the money that was taken in the second till.
The majority of [the Aleef] newsagent shops are in the center of
Manchester and a city center newsagent is an ideal location for a fraud of this
nature as there is rapid turnover of customers, most of whom are in a hurry, and
all of whom are paying in cash. The conspirators deliberately suppressed the
19

HMRC News Release, Company Directors Jailed for £5million Fraud (Nov. 13, 2007) available at
https://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=330199 (last visited Feb. 4, 2008)
(indicating that along with the skimming fraud there were related tax frauds associated with suppression of stock
purchases, and payment of tax free undeclared wages).
20
Chris Osuh, Aleef Bosses Jailed for Fraud, Manchester Evening News, Nov. 11, 2007, available at:
http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/1024144_aleef_bosses_jailed_for_fraud (last visited Feb. 4,
2008).
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takings in one of the tills in their accounts and only declared the money in the
other till to HMRC.21
The founder of Aleef Garage Ltd., Ahmed Patel, operated a charity – the Greater Lever
Muslim Society. Cash from Aleef Garage Ltd. was laundered through this charity and then back
to the Patel family.22
The success of the Aleef Garage fraud depended on close family relationships. Three
sons of the founder, Mustaq Hussain Patel (53) – in charge of overall finances of Aleef, Iqbal
Ahmed Patel (51) – in charge of staff and responsible for wages, and Mubarakali Ahmed Patel
(55) – in charge of the newsagent side of the business, were the main conspirators.23 As Steve
Armitt, Group Leader HMRC Criminal Investigations indicated, “… the investigation was made
all the more difficult because of the closed ranks of the employees involved some of whom were
close family members … [t]hose involved tried to make it as difficult as possible for the cheating
to be discovered.”24
It is not clear from published reports how the Aleef Garage fraud was initially uncovered,
although the HMRC News Release does indicate that “… the cash was used to fund private life
styles, [but it was also] transferred to other personal accounts including some in the Channel
Islands.”25
Nicholas Guercio & Victoria Constantine (formerly Guercio) v. Commissioner.26
Guerico is more typical of the size of a double till, manual skimming fraud. Guerico involved a
very small business. It involved a bar that was open twenty hours per day (6 a.m. to 2 a.m.)
serving customers on two shifts. Business was conducted only in cash.
The physical skimming of sales was very simply carried out. Each shift had its own till,
and the tills for each shift were checked against cash register tapes (to prevent employee theft).
The owners however, presented the accountant with only one of the tills and one of the cash
register tapes for each day’s operation.27 Bank deposits and tax returns were filed based on the
funds and the tapes from the disclosed tills.
21

Adrie van der Luijt, Directors Jailed for Accounting Fraud, Directors of Finance On Line (Nov. 13, 2007)
available at: http://dofonline.co.uk/economy/directors-jailed-for-accounting-fraud9284.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2008).
22
The U.K. Charity Commission reported that the annual turnover of the Greater Lever Muslim Society never
exceeded £10,000 in any year from the charity’s formation in the 1990’s up until 2002 (the year HMRC revenue
audit began), although in excess of £2.5 million had been deposited through that time. Funds moved from the
charity back to the Patel family through Channel Island accounts. HMRC News Release, supra note19, at Notes for
Editors 2; Chris Osuh, supra note20.
23
HMRC News Release, supra note19, at Notes for Editors 3, 4 & 5 (others involved in the conspiracy were
Nichole Marie Patel (34), Inayat Patel (34), Hanif Mahmed Patel (46), usman Abdullah Patel (45), Javeed Bashir
(48), and Ibrahim Vali Patel (55)).
24
Id. at 1.
25
Id. at 1.
26
Guercio & Constantine, T.C. Memo 1983-554.
27
Accountants and bookkeepers frequently become informants in skimming cases. For a case where a bookkeeper
led the IRS and the Minnesota Department of Revenue to a cash skimming scheme in an auto repair shop see F-D
Oil Company, Inc. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 560 N.W.2d 701 (1997). Although the shop destroyed
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Each Monday the owners met, divided the cash from the withheld till and destroyed the
withheld register tapes. Because two of the owners, representing 80% of the equity interests
were “hidden” behind Guerico (a nominee holder of their interests) most of the skimmed cash
left the business each Monday without a trace.28
SELF-HELP PHANTOM-WARE
Double till skimming requires that some sales not pass through, or at least are not
recorded in the official cash register records. The risk in doing this is that customers (if the cash
registers are shut down) or employees – normally the accountant – (if cash register records are
destroyed) will become suspicious, and turn in the fraudster. The alternative is to pass all sales
through the cash register and selectively eliminate certain transactions from the records of all
cash sales. In other words, the alternative is to do what Guericco did, but do it transactionally
(line-by-line) instead of eliminating a full ten-hour shift each day.
The difficulty in doing this is that modern cash registers leave audit trails. Transactions
are recorded in Z Reports (“daily” and” periodic,” normally called Z1 and Z2),29 X Reports
(“daily” and” periodic,” normally called X1 and X2)30 and in the Electronic Journal.31 Thus, a
fraudster who fears the risk that his customers (or his accountant) would reveal his fraud may
look to the cash register to hide it.

its records of invoices issued, the nature of the auto repair business is such that many customers kept accurate
records of repairs (even those paid in cash) to substantiate later warranty claims. Thus, unlike the situation where
cash payments are made in restaurants and bars, the auditors in F-D Oil could readily identify mismatches between
the accounting records and actual repair services rendered.
28
By keeping 80% of the ownership interests “hidden” the fraudsters in Guerico sought to forestall a bank deposits
analysis whereby an individual’s reported income and nontaxable items are subtracted from total deposits to
determine unreported income. For a restaurant skimming case where a bank deposits analysis is successful see
William C. Beretta v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-570. Mr. Beretta was an IRS employee, Collections
Division, who also invested in restaurants.
29
One of the most important functions of a cash register is to record sales, taxes collected, media totals, discount,
voids, and more. The report printed at the end of day or shift that reports this information and resets it for the next
day or shift is known as the "Z" report. The "Z" report function prints the sales on the cash register tape while
erasing the data from the memory. A "Z" is a once only report for a set period of time. Many Cash Register have
"Z2" feature that allows "Z" reports to be added together. When an operator "Z2’s them out” they will erase these
reports for a longer period of time. An example of a "Z2" report is a monthly report that will be used to date and
record monthly cash register sales. Every time the register is "Z'd out" (Report taken) that total is erased from the
daily sales files and added to the "Z2" file.
30
"X" reports are the identical in information and time span to the “Z” reports. “X” reports only provide reports,
they do not reset, or clear the memory. "X" reports can be taken as often as needed with no effect on sales data
recorded.
31
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Cash Register Good Practice Guide, Appendix G, at 1.2.
The electronic journal usually contains ALL transactions keyed into the more complex types of till
systems and is therefore the definitive record to obtain for audit purposes. There are exceptions,
where Electronic Journals can be programmed “not-to-store” certain keying transactions e.g.
“Training Mode.”
The Electronic Journal should not be confused with the "Z" tape as it is not a recap of the day’s sales. The
Electronic Journal tape is supposed to be a “blow-by-blow” record of every transaction made “step-by-step.” It is
most useful for going back during a day to look for mistakes that were made. This journal has been a staple in the
cash register industry since its conception. It can be used to check the Z report.
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A very dedicated fraudster will discover this on his own – a less dedicated fraudster will
learn from another businessman, an ECR or POS system sales person, or a “computer
consultant” – but there is functionality inside most modern systems to selectively suppress
entries. The rub is that some re-programming is required. This is the self-help phantom-ware
option.
The following example (one of many possible) is set out in the Cash Register Good
Practice Guide. It explains the re-programming that is necessary to support a specific “selfhelp” sales suppression. This re-programming allows cash to be skimmed by passing refund
transactions through a CASIO TE-2000 cash register. This re-programming will suppress
records of a refund in the Z Reports, the X Reports and the Electronic Journal. Once again, the
problem for fraudsters using “self-help” phantom-ware is that mistakes can be made when reprogramming, and if they are not careful the skimming can be detected through skillful till
interrogation.
CASIO TE-2000 ECR – refunds omitted from the daily sales reports. The Cash Register
Good Practice Guide indicates:
Owing to the massive range of standard programming options incorporated into
modern ECR’s and POS systems, no guarantee can therefore be given that sales
information contained in Z reports is reliable and complete. Current techniques
used to check the traders audit trail by reference to sequential numbered, dated
and timed Daily Z Reports is no longer sufficient to give assurance that the sales
data being audited is accurate. Further checks may be necessary to verify the
integrity of till reports submitted by traders … [p]rogram interrogation may reveal
that the till operating systems have been reconfigured to suppress sales
information …32
In the CASIO TE-2000 the program that controls printing on Z Reports is READ/RESET
REPORT PRINTING CONTROL, PROGRAM 0822. The procedure for reading (printing) the
program is:
(1) select PGM mode (the program mode switch);
(2) press 3
(3) press SUB TOTAL
(4) press SUB TOTAL
When the program prints the setting information will be listed on the top of the report. It should
indicate: “Program 0822, command code 00001000.” [Note: the program setting is 001000,
however the program reading is an eight digit number, thus there is a prefix of “00” added. The
prefix is not material to this discussion.] The following table breaks down the program code:
Code
0
0
1
0
0
0
Short hand identifier
D6
D5
D4
D3
D2
D1
“D” = digit
To reconfigure the 0822 program in the CASIO TE-2000 the following steps are taken:
(1) select PGM mode
32

See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Cash Register Good Practice Guide, Appendix E, at 4.1.1.
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

press 3
press SUB TOTAL
press the program that needs to be reconfigured (i.e. 0822) on the numeric keyboard.
press SUB TOTAL
press the new program code (we are changing code 001000 to 003100)
press the CA/AMT TEND key
press SUB TOTAL

Some explanation is needed on what the code at item (6) means initially and then how the
new code is derived. The previous code 001000 is interpreted as follows:
(a) D6 set to “0” indicates “print first and last consecutive numbers of the day.”
(b) D5 set to “0” indicates three things:
a. “skip zero total lines on department and transaction read/reset report”
b. “skip zero total lines on PLU read/reset report”
c. “skip zero total lines on hourly sales report.”
(c) D4 set to “1” indicates two things:
a. “print the sales ratio on read/reset report”
b. “do not suppress printing of the non-resettable grand total on the daily
reports.”
(d) D3 set to “0” indicates two things:
a. “suppress the printing of RF [refund] totals and RF count [both RF mode and
RF key]”
b. “print tax rate with tax totalizer.”
(e) D2 and D1 signify actions that are not relevant in this discussion
The new code “003100” changes the values at items D4 and D3. D4 is changed from “1”
to “3.” D4 makes two statements. The first statement, “print the sales ratio read/reset report,”
has a value of “0” for “no” and “1” for “yes,” and we want this statement to read “yes.” The
second statement, “do not suppress printing of the non-resettable grand total on the daily
reports,” has a value of “0” for “no” and “2” for “yes,” and we want this statement to also read
“yes.” Thus, D4 needs to be “3” (or, 1 + 2 = 3). We are trying to suppress printing of the nonresettable grand total on the daily reports, so to do this we need to change D4 from “1” to “3.”
D3 deals specifically with the refund (RF) function, and we need to change this value
from “0” to “1.” D3 makes two statements. The first statement, “suppress the printing of RF
[refund] totals and RF count [both RF mode and RF key]” has a value of “0” for “no” and a
value of “1” for “yes,” and we want to suppress the printing of the refunds, so this value needs to
be “1.” The second statement, “print tax rate with tax totalizer,” has a value of “0” for “no” and
“2” for “yes.” We do not need the tax rates to be printed, so the default setting of “0” is fine.
Thus, D3 needs to be “1” (or 1 + 0 = 1) instead of “0.”
Our goal is to suppress the printing of RF totals and RF count, and suppress the printing
of the non-resettable grand total on the daily reports. The code to do this is “003100” – as shown
in the following table:
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Code
Short hand identifier
“D” = digit number

0
D6

0
D5

3
D4

1
D3

0
D2

0
D1

Once re-programmed, “[t]he daily read/reset reports printed in X and Z modes will not
print the non-resettable grand total and refund transactions made in the RF mode and RF key.”33
The Guide runs two examples based on this re-programming. The first (using the “001000”
code) shows:
• sales of 1,000 (500 + 250 + 250),
• a refund of 250, and
• a cash-in-the-drawer total of 750.
The second (using the “003100” code) shows:
• sales of 750 (250 + 250 + 250),
• no refund, and
• a cash-in-the-drawer total of 750.
If in fact sales of 1,000 were made, and the business owner skimmed 250 from the ECR
and rung this “skim” through the cash register as a refund, neither the Z Report (Z1 or Z2), nor
the X Report (X1 or X2) would show it. Both the consumption tax on the sale (VAT or RST)
and the income on the sale could easily go unreported. An audit that checked tax returns against
the Z Report, even if cross-checked with the X Report would not detect the fraud.
The flaw in this particular fraud is that the refunds could show up in the Electronic
Journal (that is of course if additional programming options are not selected to eliminate the
printing of refunds in the Electronic Journal.)34 Much the same fraud can be accomplished by
recording live sales in the training mode. Training mode sales can be eliminated from Z and X
Reports as well as the Electronic Journal.35
Reliance on the Electronic Journal in a CASIO TE-2000 is not a “fail-safe” check for tax
auditors. There are significant problems with the completeness and correctness of the data in the
Electronic Journal. The Dutch Tax Administration has examined more advanced CASIO
systems, the CASIO QT-6000 and CASIO TE-4000, and is convinced that Electronic Journals in
even these machines are not secure. The main risk (in all CASIO machines) is that the RAM on
which the data are preserved is too small and there is no mechanism to store data on an external
medium. As a result, when the RAM is full, data is simply over-written. The only way to access
(and preserve) the Electronic Journal data on a CASIO machine is to use the back office program
CASIO Hospitality, but on this medium also there is no assurance of completeness and
correctness of the data.36

33

See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Cash Register Good Practice Guide, Appendix E, at 4.7.
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Cash Register Good Practice Guide, Appendix B, at 3.3 (Risk
number 40) and 5.2.6.2 (discussing a “hidden function” on the CASIO QT-7300 machines that allows the
Electronic Journal to be turned on and off).
35
Id.
36
Personal e-mail communication, Ben van der Zwet (May 30, 2008) (on file with author).
34
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Effectively, CASIO machines cannot be relied upon to preserve business records. They
can be programmed to delete records on the Z Reports and the X Reports, and can be relied upon
to delete data in the Electronic Journal automatically (after certain volume limits are reached).
FACTORY-INSTALLED PHANTOM-WARE
One of the best examples of a litigated factory-installed phantom-ware case is a Dutch
case37 involving the Grand Café chain Dudok.38 A grand café is a style of café that occupies a
single large space welcoming a large amount of foot traffic. The Dudok in Rotterdam, for
example, is located in a converted warehouse. Its central location, comfortable leather furniture
and liberal scattering of newspaper make it a high volume, cash-intensive cafe-bar-restaurant
from breakfast through midnight.
Phantom-ware was first used by Dudok to skim cash receipts in the midst of a Dutch IRS
examination. The IRS was initially concerned with staff salary. Payments were being made
under the table, and the IRS was suspicious.39 Testimony in the case indicated that on the second
day of the IRS audit the managing director of Straight Systems BV visited Dudok where he was
approached by the owner-manager. Straight Systems BV40 was the supplier of the Finishing
Touch point-of-sale cash registers that were used by Dudok. The owner-manager of Dudok
explained that he was having difficulty accounting to the IRS for the turnover.
During this conversation the Straight Systems managing director explained the existence
of a “hidden delete” option in the Finishing Touch cash registers. The court indicated that this
was, “… a hidden menu option that, after enabling said option, allowed operators of catering
establishments to delete cash register receipts from the system.”41 After this discussion “… an
employee of the defendant visited [Dudok] and explained the [technical] application of the erase
37

District Court of Rotterdam, LJN: AX6802 (Jun 2, 2006) available at:
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=AX6802 (in Dutch) (translation
on file with author); appealed to the District Court of The Hague where the judgment is upheld LJN: BC5500 (Feb.
29, 2008) available at: http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl (in Dutch) (translation on file with author).
38
See: http://hilton.org.uk/rotterdam.phtml?p=dudok
39
LJN: BC5500, at F3. Prior to using the phantom-ware installed on its system Dudok was skimming sales in a very
amateur fashion. The entire sales records of the POS system were deleted and records were reconstructed on x-cell
spreadsheets. The examining agents did not trust the spreadsheets and asked for the POS records as a back-up to
confirm what they were being shown on the audit. This in turn lead to the conversation with Straight Systems BV
where Dudok was informed that they already had phantom-ware that might solve this problem installed in their
system. Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author).
40
Straight Systems BV is a Netherlands company that specializes in single-service ECR systems where all hardware
and software are developed “in house.” The company web site offers a 24-hour help desk where there is “… one
point of contact for all hardware and software for checkout’s front office and back office systems.” Available a t:
http://www.straight.nl (in Dutch, translation on file with author) (last visited May 24, 2008).
41
LJN: AX6802, at Consideration of the Evidence (Jun 2, 2006) (in Dutch) (translation on file with author). The
case discusses three software programs: Twenty/Twenty; Finishing Touch; Tickview.exe. Twenty/Twenty was a US
touch-screen program that did not have a phantom-ware application. Straight Systems BV added the phantom-ware
application to Twenty/Twenty and renamed the program Finishing Touch. Using just this program you can view the
sales ticket and change data. With a secret command the Tickview.exe program within Finishing Touch can be
activated and the operator is asked if they would like to delete the whole ticket. If an affirmative response is given
then the system records a “no sale” and the entire audit trail to the original data is eliminated. Ben B.G.A.M. van
der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author).
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rule [or hidden delete function42], after which [Dudok] subsequently decided to start using [it]
…”43
This case finds criminal tax fraud liability not only with the restaurant operators, but also
with the suppliers of the Finishing Touch cash registers. As a consequence, the court is very
clear about the operation of the “hidden delete” function. It indicates:
The defendant’s cash register program includes various features to adjust the
receipts later on. These possibilities are clearly described in the manual and are
found easily in the menu structure of the program. If a receipt is adjusted using
these functions, a “record” thereof is kept in the files so that any adjustments can
be established afterwards. In addition [there is], a hidden option [that] exists to
delete receipts. This function is not described in the manual and is also not
included in the menu structure. Moreover the retrieval of this option is very
complicated and only possible if the defendant explained this to the buyer.
Contrary to the other features, use of this hidden option does not leave any traces
in the files that are written to the disk. As a result, it is impossible at a later date
to establish that the receipts have been deleted, hence this can, in principle, not be
checked. It is self-evident that completely removing receipts from the books is a
pre-eminent means for hiding turnover from the Internal Revenue Service.44
This is a description of the essential characteristics of a phantom-ware system. It is an
operating system designed for an ECR that for all practical purposes is fully transparent. All
traditional programming options are explained in detail in the user’s manual, all traditional
options are visible in the menu structure and the use of any of these options leaves a clear audit
trail for both the owner and external auditors. However, transparency is apparent, not real.
Embedded in the operating system is functionality that selectively eliminates sales records
without leaving an audit trail. Knowledge of this functionality is passed secretly (almost always
orally) from the ECR provider to the ECR user.
The appeals court in LJN: AX6802 reacts strongly to the following facts – the “hidden
design” of the programming – the transmission of “secret knowledge” about its existence – the
“secret instruction” that is provided in its operation:
In view of the special characteristics of the hidden option and the existence of the
program’s other features for making adjustments, the court cannot imagine any
other purpose for the hidden option than the illegal manipulation of turnover
figures. The court is therefore firmly convinced that the defendant, as the seller,
was aware of this. By selling this software to a catering establishment, the
defendant knowingly and willfully accepts the considerable chance that the buyer
will use the program to delete turnover to conceal it from the Internal Revenue
Service, with all associated tax consequences. …In view of the context within
with the delete option was discussed [between the managing director of Straight
Systems BV and the owner-manager of Dudok], the court assumes that the
42

The trial court in Rotterdam refers to the phantom-ware application as a “hidden delete function” whereas the
appeals court in The Hague refers to the phantom-ware as “the erase rule.”
43
LJN: BC5500, at F3.
44
Id.
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managing director of the defendant, and hence the defendant, knew that [Dudok]
wanted to dupe the Internal Revenue Service.45
It is particularly troubling to the appeals court that not only is, “[t]his erase rule actually
made available to various customers, [but that the] defendant also offered support to customers –
also in respect of this erase rule – by means of a helpdesk. Viewed against this background,
making the erase rule available is part of the normal conduct of the business of the defendant.”46
Saying that these practices are “part of the normal conduct of the business” of Straight
Systems BV is tantamount to saying that this fraud is a cancerous mutation that goes well beyond
the traditional fraud where cash receipts are skimmed through a two-till system. This is a fraud
that has entered the bloodstream of the market-place. As a result, the government needs to
consider market-level as opposed to single-business-enterprise-level responses.
ZAPPERS
Zappers represent the third generation of automated sales suppression technology. They
were developed in response to (a) the inherent risk of detection in self-help phantom-ware
applications (the re-programming errors that fraudsters would make were leaving traces of the
fraud) and (b) the expanded risk to developers and manufacturers in factory-installed phantomware (with only one purpose – to facilitate skimming – knowledge of and participation in the
fraud was becoming difficult to deny when the factory installed the program). The advantage of
a zapper was that it could be removed from the system, and placed in your shirt pocket as soon as
the auditors knocked on the door.
Zappers minimize risk of detection. They are physically kept apart from the ECR/POS
system they manipulate. Zappers have been found on cassettes, floppy disks, zip disks, CDs,
and memory sticks. They are inserted temporarily into the ECR/POS system to perform sales
manipulations. When the procedure is completed, the zapper is removed. If a zapper is well
developed – if it is designed by someone with detailed knowledge of the operating code it is
being used on – then no trace of the original data trail will remain. Everything will be re-written,
and the program that did it will be gone.
The cases below have been selected to draw out two points: (a) Zappers have been used
to assist in the skimming of cash receipts since the dawn of the computer age – 1981 in the case
of Stew Leonard’s Dairy, and (b) Zappers have spread around the globe – they have (for
example) been found in the US, Australia, Brazil, Canada and Sweden. It is reasonable to
assume that they are available everywhere.
The US and Australian cases exhibit custom-made Zappers – Zappers designed by inhouse computer specialists to work only on the specific ECR or POS systems in place in their
companies. The Brazilian and Canadian cases exhibit commercial Zappers – Zappers designed
by (and sold separately by) the company or the individual who designed the specific ECR or
POS systems program on which they operate, and are intended to be used widely in the market45
46

Id.
LJN: BC5500, at F4.
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place. The Swedish case exhibits a Zapper of mysterious design. Although the Swedish Zapper
works with a specific (foreign) operating system in a specific (foreign) ECR the developer is
unknown, leaving the Swedish Tax Administration in the dark about whether this is an isolated
in-house Zapper or a Zapper that it should expect to find in other similar operating systems.
In the US – Stew Leonard’s Dairy. Until recently “the largest criminal tax case in the
history of Connecticut,”47 which also was the “largest computer driven tax-evasion case in the
nation,”48 was a Zapper case. Stew Leonard’s Dairy (a local grocery chain associated at one time
with a dairy farm) in Norwalk Connecticut skimmed an estimated $17 million in receipts over a
ten year period. The cash was taken in large denomination bills by suitcase to St. Martin in the
Caribbean.49
The Connecticut Supreme Court describes the Zapper used in Stew Leonard’s Dairy as
follows:
The Dairy’s sales recording system was composed of a computerized cash
register system [with 25 ECRs] that recorded sales at the time of the transaction.
At the point of sale, each product, which contained a universal product code
(UPC) indicating its taxable or non taxable status, was scanned and the resulting
sales information was transmitted to the main computer terminal. The Equity
program [the in-house name for the Zapper], among other things, altered some of
the UPC-based computerized records of the Dairy’s gross sales. Specifically the
program reduced item and dollar sales across a broad range of products to
correspond with the amount of cash diverted each week. As we noted previously,
the Equity program did this by writing over the original sales data, thereby
rendering the original data irretrievable.
In our view, the result was akin to destroying the electronic equivalent of
cash register tapes and replacing those tapes with ones containing false sales
data.50
Stew Leonard’s Dairy is a microcosm of how the manual skimming of cash receipts has
moved into technology. There are two pressures on an enterprise like Stew Leonard’s Dairy (a)
the increased risk of detection from increasingly sophisticated auditors, and (b) the sheer
complexity of small amounts of cash from an extremely diverse retail operation.
Skimming of cash receipts began in Stew Leonard’s Dairy in the 1970’s. This was a
physical skimming. It was performed by the CFO, Barry Belardinelli who worked in the store’s
vault room where large bags of cash were received daily from the store’s cash registers.51

47

DEPT. OF THE TREAS., I. R. S. 75 YEARS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION HISTORY (1919 – 1994) 146, available at
http://www.thememoryhole.org/irs/irs_75_years.rtf (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
48
Jacques Steinberg, Connecticut Store Owner Sentenced in Tax Fraud, NYT, Sec. B, page 1, col. 3 (Oct. 21, 1993)
49
U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(although the tax case was settled, the details of the fraud are preserved in these federal sentencing appeals).
50
Leonard, 264 Conn., at 298.
51
Leonard, 37 F.3d at 33.
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The skimming was manually coordinated by Belardinelli (with the amounts and days of
the week when skimming would be performed designated by either Frank or Steven Guthman).
In about 1981 or 1982 the skimming was automated. The Second Circuit indicated:
To conceal the skim, defendants instituted a computer program that altered
the stores sales data to account for the skimmed cash. Creation of the program
was necessary to synchronize the data generated by the computerized cash
registers with the information generated by Belardinelli’s altered daily sales
reports. In 1981or 1982, Frank Guthman instructed Jeffrey Pirhalla, a store
computer programmer, to write a complex program [called the “Equity Program”]
that reduced the store’s sales and financial data by the amount of the skimmed
cash and permanently altered the data from which the books and records were
created. The program left no audit trail that it had run. Frank Guthman operated
it on the first day of each accounting week using the figures provided him by
Belardinelli and kept the tape cassette containing the program hidden in his office.
He instructed Pirhalla to keep the program secret and, from time to time, told
Pirhalla to alter the program to keep up with the store’s changing computers.52
Mr. Pirhalla was a computer specialist with detailed knowledge of the operating system
of the ECRs used in Stew Leonard’s Dairy. He was hired by Stew Leonard from the National
Cash Register (NCR) company. It was important to employ someone like Mr. Pirhalla
knowledge, because Zappers need to be re-designed whenever the base operating system is
updated. Running an old Zapper against records in an updated ECR may leave traces that
auditors could use to detect the fraud.
However, Mr. Pirhalla himself was a risk that could not be minimized. Once fraud was
suspected, “[t]he IRS and U.S. Attorney [became] very interested in Mr. Pirhalla’s first-hand
knowledge, and immediately enlisted his cooperation in return for granting him immunity from
prosecution. … The IRS [also] retained the services of NCR [National Cash Register] personnel
who were expert in the Dairy’s computer system. They, along with Mr. Pirhalla, worked under
the supervision of special agent Doreen Schultz, the IRS’s own computer book-keeping system
expert.”53
One of the special features of the Zapper in Stew Leonard’s Dairy was that it was
designed to do more than “zap” cash sales. It was designed to withstand the scrutiny of a
rigorous income tax audit – an audit that undertook to systematically match purchases
(inventory) against sales. Both prices and units bought and sold were adjusted in small amounts
on designated days by the Equity Program. Minor price changes or small but evenly spread out
increases in spoilage were designed to make the skimming nearly undetectable on normal audit.
The Connecticut Superior Court makes this clear:
As an example, the program was designed to say that today’s criteria for
the sale of cucumbers would be 50 units. If more than 50 units of cucumbers
were sold, the excess was diverted into the Equity Program. The Equity Program
scanner went through every single item that was sold that day. The amount

52
53

Id. at 35.
Brief for Appellee, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 17-18.
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diverted was spread over a wide spectrum of products.
amounted to pennies per item.54

Some calculations

The Zapper in Stew Leonard’s Dairy pre-dated memory sticks, CDs and zip files.
This Zapper was kept on a cassette in a hollowed out book in Stew Leonard’s library.
Obsolete versions of the program were kept by Frank Guthman at home in his
basement.55
In Australia – Regina v. Ida Ronen; Regina v. Nitzan Ronen; Regina v. Izar Ronen.56
Over a ten year period from 1991 through February 7, 2001 Ida Ronen and her two sons
skimmed an estimated AUD$15 to $17 million in cash sales from their clothing business
(Dolina).57 “…[T]he scope of the fraud represented by unpaid [income] tax was approximately
[AUD] $8.125.”58 The court indicates that:
Mrs. Ronen managed the business for herself and, in effect for her sons.
Customers of the retail outlets purchased by cheque, EFTPOS, credit or cash. The
precise method varied over the period of the conspiracy. The method of
implementation [of the conspiracy] agreement was simple in the extreme. In
general terms Mrs. Ronen, on behalf of herself and her sons, skimmed from the
takings most, if not all, of the cash and later distributed it to her sons and herself
for their own purposes. … For example, in the period of surveillance between
April 2000 and 7 February 2001, there was approximately 74% of the cash
skimmed sent overseas or kept in the safe. … [AUD]$ 753,400.00 was sent
overseas … [AUD] $209,525.00 was seized from the safe, …59
During most of the time the Ronen fraud was taking place Australia did not have a
national consumption tax. Like the U.S., Australia relied almost exclusively on the income tax,
although beginning in 1930 there was a Wholesale Sales Tax on certain goods imported or
produced in Australia.60 In July 2000 the Wholesale Sales Tax was replaced by the Goods and
Services Tax (GST) and this had a dramatic affect on the Ronen fraud. The court notes:
A complication arose in the middle of the 2000 calendar year. As from 1 July
2000 the Goods and Services Tax regime was introduced. This posed a
considerable problem for the offenders because proper compliance with the
requirements of the GST laws would have revealed in a dramatic manner the
amount of cash takings received in each of the retail shops. The intercepted
54

Stewart J. Leonard Sr. dba Stew Leonard’s Dairy v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, No. CV 980492503S,
2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 991, at 4-5 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Jun. 10, 2003) (emphasis added).
55
U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32, 35 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995).
56
2005 NSWSC 991.
57
A number of wholesale and retail businesses operated under this name: Dolina Enterprises Pty Ltd.; Dolina
Fashion Group, and a joint venture between these groups. Clothing was sold through conventional (third-party)
retail shops (Coles Myer, David Jones and Rockmans) as well as through shops run directly (Ronen Young
Fashions, Dolina On Fovo, Fashion Bargains as well as a retail outlet opened on the factory premises. The retail
outlets were heavily involved in discounting their clothing.
58
Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶14.
59
Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶18.
60
Australian Government, Australian Tax Office, Australian Tax History 1900 – Present, available at:
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telephone calls to which I have made reference show the substantial concerns of
each of the offenders had about this situation. They show their attempts to devise
a system to overcome the problem that they perceived might well bring about
their undoing.61
Mrs. Ronen took two steps, both of which involved technology. (1) A computer program
was developed (by George Segal, Mrs. Ronen’s “de-facto husband”) to calculate the amount of
cash that could be skimmed from each business, one that would take into account the GST and
permit at least 10% of the cash receipts of each business to be regularly banked.62 (2) A
technology consultant, Mark Talbot, was hired to set up a computer system that would allow
Mrs. Ronen to run false till rolls for each retail outlet. These false till rolls “… were intended to
give the impression to the authorities, should they investigate, that the shops were regularly
banking cash as well as other forms of takings related to the shops.”63 The false till rolls were
run at Mrs. Ronen’s apartment, not on the business premises. “Both Mr. Segal and Mr. Talbot
[with immunity] gave evidence at the trial for the prosecution.”64
Although it is clear that the Ronens were very concerned about the impact of the
GST, it is not at all clear that the Ronen fraud would have been uncovered through a
standard GST audit. In fact, “[t]he conspiracy came to light only by chance. It appears,
as a result of telephone intercepts being placed on another person’s telephone service,
that the Ronens’ involvement in the distribution of large amounts of money from
Australia to overseas locations was detected.”65 Nevertheless, the dynamics of the Ronen
case were largely controlled by perceptions – the perception that there was an increased
risk of detection through a GST audit, and the perception that technology offered shelter
from detection.
In Brazil - Operação Internet. Operação Internet or Operation Internet was conducted
by the State Tax Administration of Minas Gerais (a Brazilian State in the Southeast region close to Rio and São Paulo). The AMG corporation was the eventual target. AMG produced not
only government certified software (called Robot) for use in cash registers operating within the
state; it also produced and sold the Zapper (Quanto) that defeated it.
Litigation in Brazil can take many years to work its way through the court system, and
there is no reported cases based on Operação Internet available, however press reports describe
the investigation this way:
Three partners and a clerk at the AGM Consultancy and Systems
Corporation, Ltd., based out of Juiz de Fora, were arrested yesterday, accused of
developing a software program for dodging taxes. The company had been under
investigation for three months prior to this, and in the State Revenue Secretary’s
estimation the program, which does not tally sales as required by law and
produces no receipts, thus allowing for the monitoring of financial activity
61

Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶24 (emphasis added).
Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶¶25 & 27.
63
Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶26.
64
Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶26.
65
Ronen, 2005 NSWSC, at ¶28.
62

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1147023

through unofficial accountancy, may be in use by at least 150 commercial
establishments in the city.
All the financial activity recorded by this program was stored on a still
unidentified, Internet based network server. The Revenue Department admits
however that corporations based in other Zona da Mata-area cities, and even in
Rio de Janeiro, may be using the same software.
…Preliminary evaluations indicate that these corporations illegally
withheld between 40% and 50% of taxes owed…. AGM was licensed by the State
Revenue department to develop programs to perform accountancy functions for
commercial establishments. They supplied customers with the official program,
called “Robot,” along with the illegal program “Quanto,” which allowed sales to
be effectuated without the issuing of receipts, with a mere press of a button on the
cash register.
“With this function the establishment’s owner would be able to simply
choose when he wanted to have legal accountancy performed, and when he
wanted to illegally withhold taxes,” said Luiz Pedri, regional superintendent of
the Revenue department.66
In Canada - Audio Lab Ltd. On April 8, 2004 Revenue Quebec announced that it
executed four search warrants on the numbered company 9061-1184 Quebec Inc. which operated
a restaurant under the name San Antonio Grill in Laval, Quebec. The allegation was that a
“sales Zapper” (camoufleur de ventes) was used to delete sales records. The Zapper was on a
diskette used in connection with the restaurant’s computer system.67
Next year, on April 25, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that the director of San
Antonio Grill pleaded guilty to using a Zapper.68 A related company of similar name, Grill San
Antonio in Repentigny, also pleaded guilty to similar offences.69
Later that same year, on October 1, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that it executed
five more search warrants in Montreal and Laval with respect to Audio Lab LP, Inc. It was
under suspicion of having developed and marketing a sales Zapper, software that was compatible
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with its own restaurant cash register software, Softdine.70 Softdine was the operating software in
the cash registers at San Antonio’s Grill in Laval, and at Grill San Antonio in Repentigny.
On June 26, 2007 Audio Lab LP, Inc. pleaded guilty to charges of having, “… designed
and marketed a computer program designed to alter, amend, delete, cancel or otherwise alter
accounting data in sales records kept by means of a software that [Audio Lab LP] had designed
and marketed.” In other words, it pleaded guilty to developing a Zapper to “add-on” to its own
commercial software (Softdine) that it provided to restaurants for use in their POS systems.
Press reports directly link this conviction to the investigation begun at Grill San Antonio in Laval
in 2004.71
In Sweden - TT PI Electronique & Restodata. In an on-going Swedish investigation72
(scheduled for court late in 2008) involves an ECR manufactured from Paris, France (TT PI
Electronique) which is popular in Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Denmark, Australia,
the US and North Africa. The operating system used in the specific TT PI Electronique ECRs
under investigation includes a back-office program called Restodata.
The Restodata program is licensed and comes with a grey program dongle73 on a memory
stick. Directly attached to this dongle is a second (silver) memory stick that contains a Zapper.
Slides demonstrating the operation of the Restodata Zapper were presented by the author (with
permission of the Swedish Tax Administration) at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the FTA on June
9, 2008.74
The Zapper used in this system has the ability to either (a) selectively change line items
on a sales ticket (replacing expensive items with less expensive items and reducing the related
VAT charges) as well as (b) perform a fully automated “zapping” of all transactions so that total
sales for a day would be reduced by a specified amount. Although either approach could be used
to reduce sales, this particular zapper allows a fraudster to custom tailor the zapping operation.
However, one of the most distressing aspects of the early Swedish reports in this case is the
following comment by Martin Jansson:
In this case the restaurant under investigation used a backoffice program called
Restodata. According to the exe-file the program was produced by a company
called “Restodata Inc.” However, we haven’t been able to find that name
anywhere.75
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The Swedish case is an excellent example of where Zapper technology is headed. It is a
direct result of the internationalization of cash skimming with Zappers. In the slides presented at
the FTA is was possible to see the TT PI Electronique system move from a Swedish interface to
an English interface as the Zapper was inserted into the POS system. Although this is not
conclusive by any means, it does seem to suggest that what the Swedish Tax Administration is
up against is a bit more difficult that what Revenue Quebec was up against in the Audio Labs,
Inc. investigation, or what the State Tax Administration of Minas Gerais was up against in
Operação Internet. The Swedish Tax Administration is most likely not looking at an in-house
Zapper, nor is it looking at a locally designed and distributed Zapper. It is looking at a foreign
Zapper designed to facilitate local fraud.
CONCLUSION
It is a very good sign that the FTA has begun to turn its attention to automated sales
suppression devises – phantom-ware and zappers. Tax enforcement in the US needs to be
directed at this problem. The states have some catching-up to do, and one of the best places to
do it is just north of the border in Quebec.
Time is running on this problem. It is becoming more and more apparent that a fourth
generation of automated sales suppression devices is coming on line. The next generation is
likely to present considerable enforcement difficulties, because it will be international.
Tomorrow’s problems will be more like those in the Swedish case. The developer will be
unknown and foreign.
Zappers may once again be customized (like those Stew Leonard’s Dairy and Ronen), but
instead of being developed in-house (where the IT specialist/ developer could be brought into the
case on the side of the government in exchange for immunity) it is likely that the developer will
be located outside the enforcing jurisdiction.
Internationalization of this area has some considerable advantages for the fraudsters. It
has not been lost on the developers of automated sales suppression devices that the MRQ was
able to find zappers in seven Patio Vidal restaurant franchises, and two bars (La Tasca in
Gatineau, and O’Max in Masson-Angers) by following the customer list of Luc Primeau the
developer and distributor of Microflash cash register software they all used. Luc Primeau it
turned out, developed and sold the zappers for his own operating systems.76 However, in doing
so, he increased the risk of detection for all his clients.77 Similarly, the Belastingdiest (Dutch
IRS) was able to trace a locally designed zapper (used on produce scales in grocery stores –
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called Analysis) through approximately 1,200 businesses by simply following the customer lists
of the local developer.78 In this risk adverse industry, internationalization offers a buffer against
detection. Zappers may well be going there.
In this regard, it was a welcome e-mail that this author received from the Deputy
Commission for Tax Enforcement of the State of New York after the 2008 Annual FTA
Conference indicating that he (for one) would be “reaching out” to the MRQ to learn how to
build cases in this area.79 More states should follow this lead.
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